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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of infrastructure on productivity in the various
regions of Spain. Using the duality approach and panel data, we estimate the regional cost
functions for the three main sectors of the economy for the period 1964-1991. We also
estimate a production function with profit maximization restrictions and a production
function with regional and temporal fixed effects. Public capital is included as an unpaid
factor of production, and two separate variables are used to establish whether the different
categories of public capital have varying effects on costs. Results show that public
infrastructure noticeably reduces private costs and increases overall productivity.
Finally, there is a study of the existence of spillover effects in transport infrastructure.
Estimations suggest that such effects are of some relevance, a fact which may have
serious implications for public policy on infrastructure.
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11. Introduction
Over the past decade various investigations have been made into the impact of
public capital on economic development. However, the possibility that the stock of public
capital could be among the significant variables in the private sector production function is
something which had already been considered by ARROW and KURZ, 1970, and
GROSSMAN and LUCAS, 1974, being later contrasted by MERA, 1973, for the
Japanese regions and RATNER, 1983, for the USA. The key argument to support the
inclusion of public capital in the production function is that it increases the productivity of
private factors, and that both sources of capital are complementary, so that an increase in
public investment brings about an increase in the marginal product of private capital
thereby providing an inducement to private investment.
Among other factors which have motivated renewed interest in public capital among
economists, we could mention the following. Firstly, studies by ASCHAUER, 1989, and
MUNNELL, 1990a,b, estimate production functions in which the elasticity of the product
with respect to public capital is surprisingly high. The notion that the decreasing growth
rate in the productivity of private factors, apparent since the early seventies, could, in
part, be due to a reduction in public investment seemed to hold some truth.
In addition, concern for regional development, which grew with the formation of
the European Union, and increasing integration within the Union, have given rise to a
great number of studies which analyse the stock of public capital and its influence on the
level of national or regional development. One study which had widespread  impact at the
European level was that carried out by BIEHL et al , 1986.
However, a great number of subsequent studies have, since then, cast doubt on
what is known as the ÒAschauer effectÓ, at least as far as the estimated degree of elasticity
is concerned. The possible effect on these early findings of such econometric problems as
reverse causality, the possible omission of variables correlated with public investment or
the presence of tendencies in the series estimated, have inspired researchers to concentrate
on estimation by panel data, for entire countries as well as for regions. Findings by
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and PORTER, 1993, show how, when regional or time specific variables are controlled
using estimations with fixed or random effects, the estimated elasticities are considerably
smaller and in some cases completely cancelled out1.
Furthermore, alternative methods have been used in an attempt to circumvent these
problems. The duality theory provides a means of approaching the problem of producer
optimization and identifies the channels through which the effects of public capital are
transmitted. This theory enables us to specify cost functions or, their equivalent, profit
functions. By minimizing  costs or maximizing profits, we are able to obtain the optimum
demand for variable and fixed inputs, one of which is the stock of public capital in
infrastructure.
The basic theory for this line of research was developed by Diewert 1986, and
pioneered by DENO, 1988, using a profit function. BERNDT and HANSSON, 1992,
subsequently took the results obtained from the estimation of production functions of the
type used by ASCHAUER 1989 and MUNNELL, 1990a, and compared them with those
obtained using a cost function for Sweden, their conclusion being that cost function
models yield more plausible results. The results obtained by LYNDE and RICHMOND,
1993, for the manufacturing sector in the United Kingdom, also suggest that
infrastructure has a positive effect on both costs and production. More recent studies,
such as those of NADIRI and MAMUNEAS, 1994, for the USA and  SEITZ, 1993a,b,
for Germany, estimate national cost functions for various sectors. Studies carried out at
regional level are fewer in number, though, as SEITZ and LICHT, 1994, point out, since
most types of infrastructure have a clear spatial dimension, regional or even urban
disaggregation may be more advisable for this type of study, in spite of possible spillover
effects.These same authors have estimated a regional cost function for Germany, as have
MORRISON and SCHWARTZ, 1996 for the USA. On the whole, the results obtained
show that public capital has a significant positive effect in reducing production costs.
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production function. In the first place, it incorporates business behaviour theory by
beginning with the hypothesis that businesses minimize (maximize) their production costs
(profits) by estimating input demand along with the cost equation. This alternative
approach provides the opportunity to study the possible effects of public investment on
cost saving and on private input demand at a given level of production. It furthermore
offers a means of avoiding some of the econometric problems involved in production
functions2. This second approach, never previously applied at Spanish regional level, is
the one we have chosen to use in this paper.
Our aim is to provide an approximate estimation of the impact of various types of
infrastructure on Spanish regional production costs in the agricultural, industrial and
services sectors for the period 1964-1991. Regional level analysis may be advisable
because many of the infrastructure stocks have close territorial links. In addition, the use
of regional data provides a richer sample and the means to make comparisons in order to
tell whether the differences in development from one region of Spain to another can be
linked to public capital disparities.
The content of this paper is presented as follows. The following section describes
the theoretical framework. Section three presents the data used. This is followed by an
analysis of the results obtained, after which there is a discussion of the possible existence
of spillover effects. Finally, the most significant conclusions of the study are outlined.
2. A Theoretical Framework
The main feature of any type of infrastructure is the fact that it is public; that is, it is
provided by the State free of charge or at a low price to the user. If infrastructure affects
the productivity of private factors of production, at a a given level, a greater stock of
infrastructure brings about an increase in production with no cost increase, with the result
that the cost per unit of the product is reduced. In this paper, following the practice of
most other studies, we will avoid considering that services provided by infrastructure are
paid for through taxation3.
42.1. Cost function model
If public capital influences the productivity of private factors, it must be included in
the cost function:
C=C (Y, w, I, t) [1]
where C  is the twice continuously differentiable cost function; Y , the production value;
w, the vector of private input prices; and I, the stock of public capital. The time index t is
included to allow for technical progress. For ease of notation, this and the following
equations do not carry the subindices for sector, region and time.
Costs may be calculated from the amounts and prices of the private factors used:
C = CI * pCI + L*pL+ K* pKs
where CI denotes intermediate inputs; L, the labour factor; K, private capital;  and pC, pL,
y pK the respective prices of these.
In our case, lack of data as to the amount and prices of raw materials or intermediate
inputs at regional level obliges us to use the following function:
C = L*pL+ K* pK [2]
Our cost function in reality, therefore, is a primary cost function which depends not
on the production value but rather on the value added: Y =VA. This is how it was
expressed by SEITZ y LICHT, 19954.
The anticipated effect of infrastructure on the production function implies that (∂Yi /
dI)  ≥ 0. This effect can also be evaluated in the cost function, by differentiating  [1] with
respect to I:
σ
∂
∂I
C(Y, p , p , I,t)
I
L K
= − [3]
where sI denotes the amount by which costs are reduced when public capital is increased
by one unit, this is also known as Òthe shadow price of public capitalÓ. Application of the
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between the marginal product and the shadow price:
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It is to be expected, therefore, that, if the shadow price of the capital is positive,
firms located in regions with better infrastructure should have a cost advantage as
compared to those located in less well-endowed regions. The implication of this is that the
variable I could be used as a strategic weapon in regional politics.
Application of Shephard's Lemma (CHAMBERS, 1988) to the cost equation [1]
yields the private factor demand equations. These equations depend upon the supposition
that firms demand a combination of capital and labour factors which will minimize their
costs for each level of prices and public capital stock:
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The demand functions, therefore, depend on the same variables as the cost function.
Available technology, the output level, public capital and factor prices determine the
demand for each private factor. Public capital can affect cost structure in the various
sectors in two ways. Firstly, more or better infrastructure can reduce the unit cost of a
product. In addition, firms will adjust their demand for private factors according to
whether public capital is complementary to or substitutive of private factors. When the
private factor demand functions are derived with respect to the different types of public
capital, the nature of this relationship is revealed:
e
¶
¶
¶
¶ ¶
e
¶
¶
¶
¶ ¶L,I
2
L K
K,I
2
L KL
I
C Y, p , p , I,t
PL I
K
I
C Y, p , p , I,t
PK I
= =
( )
= =
( )* *
, [6]
Multiplication by the quotients I/L and I/K respectively yields the corresponding
elasticities:
6h
¶
¶
h
¶
¶L,I L,I K,I K,I
L
I
I
L
e
I
L
K
I
I
K
e
I
K
= * = = * =
* *
, [7]
2.2. Production function with profit maximization restrictions
A profit function can be expressed as:
B=f(L,K,I,t)*p7-C=f(L,K,I,t)*py-(L*pL+K*pK) [8]
and the maximization conditions are:
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thus, the labour and private capital cost shares in total production must be equal to their
elasticities. We can estimate a production function with these constraints.
2.3. The empirical model
In order to limit the influence of restrictions, normally imposed a priori, we propose
the use of a flexible function, as in most cost-function studies. SinceWe expect relevant
differences in the sectorial cost function parameters, we will include sectorial dummy
variables for all the exogenous variables. We will also test the significance of regional
specific effects, such as locational advantages, including regional dummy variables.
These fixed effects should also help us to avoid autocorrelation problems.
Since the cost function needs to be grade 1 homogeneous (that is to say that an
increase of the same proportion in private factor prices brings about an equal increase in
the total cost) we impose this restriction which requires normalization of input prices by
dividing them by the capital price, thereby obtaining the following function:
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Application of Shephard's Lemma to this equation yields the function for the labour
cost share (SL) in the total costs:
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Since the sum of the cost shares totals 1, the capital cost share equation cannot be
taken into account during the estimation process.
The restricted production function is
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For the non restricted production function we have estimated [12] but, as is normal
in empirical studies, the variables including t have been substituted by fixed temporal
effects.
3. Data
All data used correspond to the period 1964-1991. Data concerning public and
private capital are compiled by the IVIE and published by the BBV Foundation. Data on
regional GVA have been taken at two-year intervals from series compiled by the BBV and
included in regular issues of the publication ÒRenta Nacional de Espaa y su distribucin
provincialÓ (ÒThe Spanish National Income and its distribution throughout the
provincesÓ). The GVA series have been deflated according to the sectorial deflator
calculated by the afore-mentioned body in its Annual Report.
The various investigations into the impact of public capital on production or costs all
use different variables to measure public capital. In some cases, what is taken into account
is the set of infrastructures which can be said to be relevant to production: transport,
communications, water supply and sewage disposal, education and health care. In other
instances, the different types of public capital are restricted or separated. In this paper, we
have opted to estimate the models with a broad variable Òpublic capitalÓ (PC) including
transport, hydraulic, urban, education and health care infrastructure, and with a narrower
variable, transport infrastructure (TI). The reason for this distinction is that, although we
could expect a stronger effect on cost and production of public capital related to transport
(roads, ports, airports), the results are in fact weaker5. We think that part of this
unexpected result is due to the presence of spillover effects, especially important in
network-type capital and among regions.
Employment and wage data have also been taken from ÒRenta Nacional de Espaa y
su distribucin provincialÓ. The wage figure has been divided by the number of
9employees to obtain the labour unit cost, although this has been multiplied by the total
number of employees in each sector for the cost estimation. Wages have been deflated in
accordance with the price index for each sector.
In estimating capital costs we have used the concept of Òthe user cost of capitalÓ as
developed by JORGENSON 19636:
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where IPK denotes the capital price index; IPSi , the price index for the sector; r , the
interest rate on electricity shares; andd, the capital depreciation rate.
The price index used is that calculated by the IVIE to deflate the series of productive
private capital. Interest rates have been taken from the Bank of Spain's Annual Report.
The interest rate on electricity shares has been chosen because it is the only indicator
which can be dated back without interruption to the first year of our series.7
The depreciation rate for each sector has been calculated by taking the figure
obtained from the series compiled by the IVIE. Where the year = t, and private capital
investment = InvK:
dt
t 1 t t
t
(K InvK ) K
K
=
+ -- [16]
A highly detailed cost function would need to include rather than the stock of public
capital, the services provided to firms by them. Because of the obvious difficulty involved
in measuring such services, the stock is used as a proxy variable. The stock is often
adjusted in order to reflect a heavier use of any particular variable. Arguments to the effect
that road use by firms changes over the years in proportion to their production level, that
the number of school-age children varies, or that congestion in some services can reduce
use by the productive sector during some periods, have led to adjustments in these
variables by an index, usually the capital utilization rate.
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In this study, we have not adjusted the stock of capital with variables to bring us
nearer to the volume of production. This is mainly because there is no suitable variable
available, but also for economic reasons. Adjustment can give rise to false correlations,
because the close correlation between production and this kind of rate would produce a
similar effect between the variable (public capital*utilization rate) and production. In any
event, studies comparing estimations with adjusted and unadjusted public capital have
found results to be similar8.
A second issue is whether to estimate average or total cost functions. Empirical
studies of regions use total cost functions, while national studies of sectors tend to opt for
estimating average costs. No reason is usually given for preferring one method to the
other. In our opinion, total cost functions make it necessary either to calculate the
approximate amount of public capital used by each sector or to estimate a cost function for
each sector. Average cost functions do not require these adjustments, since the average
costs for any sector will benefit equally from an improvement in infrastructure, which
would suggest that they are the more suitable for national studies.
In regional studies, the  estimation of an average cost function presents a further
problem: the difference in size between regions (in Spain quite marked) both with respect
to area and population, which can affect results. Larger regions will obviously have
received greater public investment, but this not mean that their stock of public capital is
better. To illustrate this point, the following table shows the ratios of stock of economic
infrastructure to private capital, population and area per region.
We consider that the comparison of data across the different regions is the main
difficulty which arises when using panel data to assess the impact of infrastructure on the
cost function. The problem becomes even more complex if we take into account the fact
that building costs of some infrastructures, particularly roads, differ from one region to
another. In this case it is likely that the monetary indicators used are not as suitable as the
physical ones. This does not mean, however, that regional analysis is not useful.
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Comparison of how infrastructure stocks evolve throughout the regions provides a wealth
of data which would be impossible to obtain from national figures.
4. Results
Equations 10 and 11 have been estimated using maximum likelihood estimation of a
constrained system allowing for regional specific effects. We hope in this way to be able
to obtain a closer estimate of the varying impact that an infrastructure stock of similar
monetary value can have in different regions. Equations 12, 13 and 14 have been
estimated in the same way. The production function without restrictions has been
estimated with temporal and regional fixed effects9.
The results of the six estimations (two  for each model: the first with public capital
and the second with transport infrastructure) are shown in tables 7, 8 and 9. Although the
variables including public capital are not in all cases significant, the likelihood ratio tests
indicate their overall significance (tables 7b, 8b, and 9b). Region-specific and sector-
specific dummies also prove to be significantly different from zero. We have confirmed
that the cost function fulfils regularity conditions: it is increasing for production and
concave in price inputs at each point of the sample.
Table 2 shows the average regional cost elasticities with respect to public capital and
transport infrastructure in each sector, for the beginning, middle and end of the period.
It can be seen how industry and services show similar cost/public capital elasticities,
slightly higher in in the secondary sector and greater than in agriculture. Estimated
elasticities for industry are similar to those obtained by other authors10. The lower
elasticity observed in the agricultural sector could be due to any one of a variety of factors:
the influence of weather conditions or changes in agricultural prices, or even unreliable
statistics.
For agriculture, the results change substantially from one estimation to another and
over time. The influence in agriculture of such uncontrolled variables as soil quality,
weather conditions, subsidies or international price fluctuations, as well as the actual
reliability of the statistical data  (a substantial part of the workforce may be made up of
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black labour11) means that we must exercise caution in our interpretation. Another aspect
also worthy of consideration is the heterogeneous nature of the agricultural sector
throughout the regions of Spain, both with respect to production functions and to costs.
Care is also necessary when it comes to evaluating and interpreting our estimations
for the services sector, since less competition and the weight of the services provided by
the public administration are factors which must be borne in mind.
Paradoxically, those for the model including exclusively transport infrastructures,
are the lowest. A possible explanation for this is that in this type of public capital a greater
discrepancy can arise between measurements made in monetary terms and those made in
physical terms. It must also be borne in mind that this type of capital stock is of a more
pronounced public character, in so far as its use  is "non-exclusive". A region with a low
ratio of transport infrastructure to private capital may actually be much better off than one
in the opposite situation. A case in point is that of Madrid which is the least well-endowed
if we are to judge by its ratios of economic infrastructure to private capital or to
population, in comparison to the two Castiles or Extremadura, regions for which these
ratios are much more favourable (table 1).
A further issue which can be addressed from this approach is the effect of a
variation in infrastructure stocks on factor demand. This overall effect is comprised of
two elements. The first, which could be referred to as the productivity effect, is a result of
the reduction in private costs per product unit which comes about as a consequence of the
increase in public capital. This effect can be measured with the cost elasticity of
infrastructure and is shown in tables 2 and 3. To make cross-checking easier, it has also
been included for model 1 in table 4.
The second effect, known as the total cost share, can be measured by using the cost
share elasticity values for public capital: (¶Si/¶lnI)/Si, when i=K,L). As can be seen from
the results in table 4, an increase in infrastructure causes an increase in the private capital
cost share over total cost (ElaSK/I)., and hence a relative increase in capital demand
Obviously, there is a reduction in the labour cost share (ElaSL /I).
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The sum of these effects demonstrates the impact that an increase in infrastructures
will have on factor demand (under the hypothesis of fixed output). The net effect on
labour is, due to the substitution of inputs, almost 5 points greater than that on private
capital.
These conclusions are backed up by the results of the production functions with and
without maxmization restrictions. Table 5 shows average production elasticities for the
three models.
The elasticities for the production and profits function for the industrial sector are
greater than for other sectors, and similar to those obtained for other regions of Spain by
MAS et al. We notice a slight fall throughout the period in the three models, and a
substantial reduction in elasticities when we use transport infrastructures, negative values
being reached in the year 1991. The results of the two new estimations, therefore,
confirm those obtained from the cost function.
One of the reasons which would explain the lower cost elasticities with respect to
infrastructure in the model which includes TI, is that the relevant spatial reference for
transport infrastructure is not of a regional nature. Road improvements in one region can
have an effect on transport costs in its neighbouring regions, giving rise to ÒspilloverÓ
effects, the extent of which we have not calculated, but of which we will attempt to give
an approximate estimation in the next section.
5. Spatial productivity spillover effects in transport infrastructure
Our results may be revealing the presence of so-called Òspillover effectsÓ, that is,
the fact that public capital, and specifically transport infrastructure, provides services to
producers outside the region in which it is located. What is crucial, therefore, is not the
transport infrastructure of the individual region, but rather, that of the country as a whole.
The danger that such effects may prevent regional estimations from accurately reflecting
the impact of public capital was first suggested by MUNNELL, 1990b, on discovering
that the estimated elasticity for individual states in the USA was approximately half that
estimated for the country as a whole.
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Few studies concentrate specifically on the analysis of spillover effects. HOLTZ-
EAKIN and SCHWARTZ, 1995, create a production function in which they incorporate a
variable to measure the ÒeffectiveÓ stock of roads and motorways, which captures varying
combinations of this type of infrastructure in the entire US and in the member states.
Their findings are unfavourable from the point of view of the spillover hypothesis.
Although it does not constitute the main aim of their study, MAS et al 1994 compare
the results of production functions for Spain which include only the region's own stock
of public capital, with those obtained by adding to this that of the bordering regions.
Elasticities are greater in the second case, leading these researchers to conclude that there
is positive evidence to support the spillover effect hypothesis.
It is not easy to confirm the existence of spillover effects in transport
infrastructures, and none of the methods used in the studies we have quoted is without its
problems. Our own standpoint, however, differs from that taken in these studies. A
variable is needed which will represent the stocks which are relevant in each region. The
proxy variable which we will use in our attempt to reflect spillover depends upon the
hypothesis that the infrastructures most relevant to any region are the ones which belong
to those other regions with which it has the strongest commercial ties. In this way we
bring the concept of public capital closer to that of Òservice provided by public capitalÓ,
which is crucial for cost analysis.
The new variable12, which will be named Òspillover effectÓ, SE, for  region i, es:
SE TI FTi j j i
j
= *
=
å ,
1
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Where TIj  are the transport infrastructures of the region j; andFTj,i  the share in the
total flow of trade towards j  taken up by trade from i.
SEi is a linear combination of the infrastructure in region i, multiplied by the rate of
trade flow with origin and destination in the region i on the total flow of trade with
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destination i, and of the stock of the remaining communities, also multiplied by the rate of
trade from i towards j  on the total flow with destination j .
Use of these rates enables us to ÒweightÓ more heavily those regions with closer
ties. Nor does the capital-costs relationship suffer, since the new variable possesses the
property whereby SSE coincides with STI.
Data relevant to the exchange of goods between regions are taken from the study by
ARCARONS et al, 1992. The only data at our disposal are those for the year 1987, and it
is these which have been used to create the variable SE  for the whole period.
The estimated parameters are in the last two columns of tables 7, 8 and 9. Table 6
shows the results from estimation with our variable SE, together with those obtained by
using transport infrastructures (TI). Variables SE and TI are highly correlated, since the
flow of trade to and from the region (FTi,i) is in all cases more than 60% of the total, and
in several cases  exceeds 80%. In addition, since the flow of trade data is for a single
year, time variations are minimal. This means that there was no reason to expect a
significant alteration in estimations. However, cost and product elasticities are noticeably
higher in the model incorporating SE (around 4% on average) which suggests the
possible presence of spillover effects.
The analysis of spillover effects is only the first outcome of a line of research which
we intend to follow up in the future. Other ways of weighting variables will need to be
used and incorporated into the production and cost functions in order to confirm or refute
the findings of this study.
6. Conclusion
Our findings show that public capital reduces private production costs, in this way
coinciding with all studies of cost functions for other countries, both at national and
regional level.
As far as the results for sectors are concerned, the greatest savings in private costs
for each additional unit of public investment occur in the industrial sector, followed by the
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service sector. Cost savings through public investment have a positive effect on
production, especially in the two sectors just mentioned. Estimated elasticities are slightly
higher than those obtained in recent studies made to estimate regional production
functions.
We have also confirmed that public capital and private capital factors are
complementary, while labour and public capital are substitutive. The sum of productivity
effects and cost shares shows that, in a fixed production context, an increase in
infrastructure gives rise to a five points greater decrease in labour than in private capital.
This effect is very similar in the three sectors. The increased in private productivity
brougth about caused by the infrastructure investment should, at any rate, offset the
negative impact on the labour demand.
 In consequence, therefore, and with all due caution, these conclusions confirm the
idea of the necessity of a public policy on infrastructure.
In addition, we have discovered evidence to support the hypothesis of the spillover
effect. The presence of this effect has serious implications for infrastructure policy, in
particular in a decentralized framework such as that of Spain. More precisely, with a view
to efficiency, the suggestion which arises is of the need for a centralized source of public
capital, or for very close coordination and planning between the various Autonomous
Communities holdingpower in the region. Likewise, it would seem useful to bear this
effect in mind when drawing up the conditions for the transfer of responsability for
infrastructures and also in the ongoing debate concerning the exact degree of
responsability to be transferred.
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Tables
Table 1. Economic infrastructure indicators (1)
Region EI/ private capital Position EI/area Position EI/ population Position
Andalusia 0.15 7 7.88 12 106 15
Aragon 0.16 5 5.03 15 202 4
Asturias 0.15 9 19.61 5 188 5
Balearic Is. 0.12 12 19.52 6 159 8
Canary Is. 0.21 3 29.57 3 161 7
Cantabria 0.09 16 14.04 10 147 9
Castile Mancha 0.16 6 3.08 16 145 10
Castile Leon 0.17 4 5.18 14 187 6
Catalonia 0.10 14 22.92 4 128 11
Extremadura 0.14 10 3.00 17 113 13
Galicia 0.15 8 11.97 11 128 12
The Rioja 0.26 1 16.76 8 332 1
Madrid 0.08 17 40.30 2 73 17
Murcia 0.10 15 6.67 13 80 16
Navarre 0.24 2 14.46 9 302 2
Basque Country 0.13 11 57.85 1 204 3
Valencia 0.12 13 16.93 7 111 14
(1) Averages for 1964-1991
Source: Authors' own estimates using IVIE data.
Table 2. Public capital cost elasticities(1)
1964 1991 Media
PC TI PC TI PC TI
Agriculture -0.052 0.088 -0.232 0.026 -0.144 0.053
Industry -0.219 -0.081 -0.113 0.014 -0.154 -0.024
Services -0.206 -0.086 -0.099 0.056 -0.145 -0.011
(1) Regional averages by sectors for the years 1964 y 1991. and average for the period
Table 3. Cost elasticity of public capital for each  region and sector(1)
Agriculture Industry Services
Region PC TI PC TI PC TI
Andalusia -0.052 0.158 -0.059 0.043 -0.069 0.031
Aragon -0.136 0.061 -0.159 -0.027 -0.158 -0.018
Asturias -0.175 0.02 -0.152 -0.02 -0.174 -0.027
Balearic Is. -0.207 -0.02 -0.249 -0.093 -0.16 -0.019
Canary Is. -0.158 0.036 -0.211 -0.065 -0.145 -0.011
Cantabria -0.197 -0.006 -0.237 -0.082 -0.214 -0.05
La Mancha -0.102 0.099 -0.165 -0.033 -0.164 -0.021
Castile-Leon -0.083 0.122 -0.111 0.007 -0.121 0.003
Catalonia -0.104 0.101 0.019 0.1 -0.042 0.046
Extremadura -0.138 0.056 -0.249 -0.094 -0.194 -0.038
Galicia -0.09 0.12 -0.123 -0.003 -0.125 5E-04
The Rioja -0.198 -0.01 -0.307 -0.135 -0.26 -0.076
Madrid -0.209 -0.027 -0.043 0.056 -0.038 0.047
Murcia -0.159 0.034 -0.211 -0.066 -0.187 -0.034
Navarre -0.181 0.009 -0.224 -0.074 -0.215 -0.05
Basque Country -0.161 0.04 -0.069 0.039 -0.118 0.003
Valencia -0.099 0.105 -0.061 0.041 -0.088 0.021
Average -0.144 0.053 -0.154 -0.024 -0.145 -0.011
(1) average values for the period
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Table 4. Elasticities of labour cost and private capital shares with respect to public capital. and product
elasticity with respect to public capital (1)
ElaSL/I ElaSK/I ElaC/I
1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge
Agricul. -0.012 -0.018 -0.015 0.123 0.029 0.055 -0.052 -0.232 -0.144
Industry -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 0.038 0.035 0.035 -0.219 -0.113 -0.154
Services -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.065 0.05 0.055 -0.206 -0.099 -0.145
Total effect L Total effectK
1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge
Agricul. -0.064 -0.25 -0.159 0.071 -0.203 -0.089
Industry -0.234 -0.128 -0.169 -0.18 -0.078 -0.119
Services -0.219 -0.086 -0.153 -0.141 -0.049 -0.09
 (1) Values calculated for model 1 (I = total public capital) in %
ElaSL/I = Labour share effect: ¶lnSL/¶lnI
ElaSK/I = Private capital share effect: ¶lnSK/¶lnI
ElaC/I = Cost effect: ¶lnC/¶lnI
Table 5. A comparison of  production elasticities when estimating with TI  or SE
Cost function Restricted Production f. Production function
Sector 1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge
Transport infrastructure. TI
Agriculture -0.095 -0.028 -0.058 0.062 -0.068 0.002 -0.045 0.117 0.054
Industry 0.088 -0.012 0.028 0.181 -0.033 0.079 0.168 0.122 0.138
Services 0.087 -0.058 0.012 0.13 -0.06 0.035 0.096 -0.013 0.031
Spillover Effect. SE
Agriculture -0.066 0.02 -0.017 0.081 -0.043 0.022 0 0.137 0.088
Industry 0.137 0.04 0.073 0.223 0.004 0.118 0.216 0.155 0.177
Services 0.143 -0.024 0.055 0.177 -0.045 0.066 0.093 -0.013 0.028
Table 6. Production Elasticities (regional average). ElaY/I.
Cost function Restricted Production f. Production function
Sector 1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge 1964 1991 AvÕge
Public capital: PC
Agriculture 0.061 0.268 0.165 0.077 -0.031 0.025 0.239 0.312 0.296
Industry 0.247 0.131 0.173 0.214 0.068 0.146 0.233 0.178 0.198
Services 0.218 0.11 0.156 0.196 0.043 0.12 0.065 -0.018 0.014
Transport Infrastructure: TI
Agriculture -0.095 -0.028 -0.058 0.062 -0.068 0.002 -0.045 0.117 0.054
Industry 0.088 -0.012 0.028 0.181 -0.033 0.079 0.168 0.122 0.138
Services 0.087 -0.058 0.012 0.13 -0.06 0.035 0.096 -0.013 0.031
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Table 7.a. Parameter estimates for the cost function
Parameter I = PC I= TI I= Spillover Effect
Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Cte 10.33 3.51 9.313 3.45 11.36 3.96
DI 7.747 2.61 2.34 0.81 4.182 1.35
DS 2.258 0.76 -3.35 -1.15 -2.35 -0.75
Y 0.233 0.84 0.189 0.73 0.048 0.18
Y2 -0.47 -1.71 -0.03 -0.11 -0.17 -0.57
Y3 -0.02 -0.09 0.397 1.47 0.359 1.25
l(PL/PK) 0.886 12.1 0.848 11.8 0.792 10.5
l(PL/PK)2 -0.3 -2.91 -0.3 -3.02 -0.26 -2.46
l(PL/PK)3 -0.21 -2.02 -0.14 -1.41 -0.1 -0.93
I -0.64 -2.73 -0.63 -2.74 -0.8 -3.29
I2 -0.69 -2.85 -0.25 -1.04 -0.42 -1.56
I3 -0.39 -1.61 0.09 0.36 -0.02 -0.06
t 0.282 5.7 0.206 4.23 0.239 4.85
t2 -0.14 -2.23 -0.18 -2.79 -0.16 -2.34
t3 -0.15 -2.39 -0.2 -3.09 -0.19 -2.88
Yl(PL/PK) 0.005 0.58 -0 -0.29 -0.01 -0.95
Yl(PL/PK)2 0.024 1.83 0.021 1.71 0.021 1.61
Yl(PL/PK)3 -0 -0.03 0.013 1.21 0.016 1.31
YI 0.055 2.52 0.065 2.97 0.076 3.38
YI2 0.04 1.85 0.003 0.13 0.015 0.63
YI3 0.008 0.39 -0.03 -1.34 -0.02 -1.04
Yt -0.01 -1.72 -0.01 -2.99 -0.01 -3.14
Yt2 -0.01 -0.81 0.006 0.93 0.005 0.76
Yt3 -0 -0.47 0.005 0.81 0.002 0.37
l(PL/PK)I -0 -0 0.01 1.21 0.02 2.24
l(PL/PK)I2 -0.02 -1.25 -0.02 -1.07 -0.02 -1.14
l(PL/PK)I3 0.009 0.57 -0.01 -0.86 -0.02 -1.12
l(PL/PK)t -0.03 -20.3 -0.03 -22.3 -0.03 -22.6
l(PL/PK)t2 0.025 12.7 0.025 13.6 0.026 13.7
l(PL/PK)t3 0.023 11.7 0.025 13.2 0.025 13.3
It -0.02 -4.01 -0.01 -1.82 -0.01 -2.26
It2 0.016 2.17 0.008 1.12 0.007 0.83
It3 0.018 2.74 0.016 2.26 0.018 2.34
LL 1245.7 1230.8 1236.3
Table 7.b. Hypothesis testing
Restrictions Log likelihood CHI-2 D.F.
PC I=YI=LI=It=0 1213.5 64.4 12
DR=0 1070.4 350.6 16
DS=0 574.6 1342.2 22
TI I=YI=LI=It=0 1213.5 34.6 12
DR=0 1048.1 365.4 16
DS=0 556.9 1347.8 22
SE I=YI=LI=It=0 1213.5 45.6 12
DR=0 1051.8 369 16
DS=0 569.5 1333.6 22
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Table 8. Parameter estimates for the restricted production function
Parameter I = PC I= TI I= Spillover Effect
Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
Cte -0.99 -0.51 0.673 0.38 1.11 0.6
DI -2.44 -1.25 -3.28 -1.73 -2.88 -1.41
DS 1.649 0.9 1.179 0.66 0.948 0.49
K 0.347 3.75 0.332 3.59 0.388 4.04
YK2 0.236 1.87 0.308 2.45 0.248 1.91
K3 -0.11 -0.85 -0.13 -1.02 -0.17 -1.3
L 0.772 4.58 0.774 4.89 0.608 3.67
L2 0.409 1.77 0.263 1.19 0.324 1.38
L3 -0.17 -0.8 -0.16 -0.78 -0.08 -0.37
I -0.19 -1.05 -0.43 -2.41 -0.4 -2.2
I2 -0.26 -1.07 -0.04 -0.18 -0.13 -0.48
I3 0.227 0.97 0.333 1.63 0.317 1.33
t 0.002 0.05 0.039 1.26 0.009 0.3
t2 0.194 4.21 0.17 4.03 0.204 4.58
t3 0.081 1.79 0.087 2.06 0.121 2.73
KL -0.02 -2.44 -0.03 -3.73 -0.02 -3.06
KL2 -0.04 -3.05 -0.03 -2.2 -0.03 -2.43
KL3 0.013 1.01 0.022 2 0.017 1.45
KI -0 -0.57 0.006 0.65 -0 -0.51
KI2 0.039 2.67 0.021 1.5 0.031 1.98
KI3 0.003 0.18 -0 -0.3 0.004 0.28
Kt 0.031 15.3 0.029 15.5 0.03 16
Kt2 -0.03 -10.8 -0.03 -10.7 -0.03 -10.6
Kt3 -0.03 -10.2 -0.03 -10.5 -0.03 -10.5
LI 0.027 2.1 0.036 2.73 0.045 3.32
LI2 -0.01 -0.52 -0.01 -0.53 -0.01 -0.54
LI3 -0.01 -0.74 -0.02 -1.19 -0.02 -1.33
Lt -0.02 -10.3 -0.02 -10.5 -0.02 -11
Lt2 0.023 6.99 0.024 7.75 0.025 7.65
Lt3 0.023 6.47 0.023 7.01 0.025 7.32
It -0.01 -2.33 -0.01 -2.92 -0 -1.99
It2 -0.01 -2.48 -0.01 -3.16 -0.01 -3.62
It3 -0.01 -1.81 -0.01 -2.23 -0.01 -3.11
LL 1055.9 1042.8 1048.9
Table 8.b. Hypothesis testing
Restrictions Log likelihood CHI-2 D.F.
PC I=YI=LI=It=0 985.8 140.2 12
DR=0 850.7 410.4 16
DS=0 -280.4 2672.6 22
TI I=YI=LI=It=0 985.8 114 12
DR=0 850.4 384.8 16
DS=0 -281.3 2648.2 22
SE I=YI=LI=It=0 985.8 126.2 12
DR=0 857.8 382.2 16
DS=0 -278.5 2654.8 22
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Table 9.a. Parameter estimates for the production function without restrictions
Parameter I = PC I = TI I= Spillover Effect
Estimate t Estimate t Estimate t
K 0.375 1.40 0.002 0.01 0.1032 0.35
K2 0.5834 1.16 1.1855 2.15 1.0302 1.82
K3 1.429 1.93 2.1434 3.04 2.1414 2.73
L 1.6548 6.05 1.8543 6.83 1.7065 5.85
L2 -1.928 -4.70 -1.934 -4.53 -2.043 -4.52
L3 -2.03 -3.09 -2.489 -3.63 -2.48 -3.37
I -0.998 -4.70 -0.725 -2.99 -0.815 -3.44
I2 1.2896 3.61 0.723 1.80 0.9904 2.32
I3 0.7159 1.83 0.444 1.32 0.436 1.14
KL -0.107 -6.76 -0.069 -3.95 -0.074 -4.38
KL2 0.1196 3.99 0.0531 1.63 0.074 2.17
KL3 0.0782 2.42 0.0306 1.13 0.0335 1.11
KI 0.0922 6.00 0.1046 6.11 0.0993 5.57
KI2 -0.144 -4.85 -0.15 -4.56 -0.157 -4.53
KI3 -0.199 -4.09 -0.24 -4.47 -0.239 -4.15
LI 0.0154 0.59 -0.043 -1.46 -0.026 -0.90
LI2 0.0346 0.78 0.1045 2.02 0.09 1.70
LI3 0.1236 1.97 0.2132 3.37 0.2086 2.96
Cte -1.124 -0.54 -1.076 -0.55 -0.376 0.00
LL 401.8 374.9 375.2
Table 9.b. Hypothesis testing
Restrictions Log likelihood CHI-2 D.F.
PC I=YI=LI=It=0 338.1 127.4 12
DR=0 303.1 196.5 16
DS=0 -457.9 1899.4 22
TI I=YI=LI=It=0 338.1 73.6 12
DR=0 254 41.8 16
DS=0 -457.7 1165.2 22
SE I=YI=LI=It=0 338.1 74.2 12
DR=0 261.4 227.6 16
DS=0 -457.9 1666.2 22
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Notes
1 GRAMLICH (1994) revises the greater part of the literature concerning the effects of
infrastructure. DE LA FUENTE (1996) also revises all these studies, with a brief
explanation of the econometric problems affecting early findings.
2  For an analsysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each theoretical approach,
please consult BERNDT (1991).
3 The majority of the afore-mentioned studies consider infrastructure as an unpaid factor.
This is not a very realistic supposition, since infrastructure is financed through a variety
of taxes, paid licences, tolls, etc. However, infrastructure may be taken to be impure
public goods. In this case, taxation on income or production will be preferred because this
internalizes excessive or over-use of infrastructure, as demonstrated by BARRO and
SALA-I-MARTêN (1992) with a growth model.
4 MORRISON and SCHWARTZ (1996) make a similar simplification, including energy
products but excluding other intermediate inputs. Their reasons for this are twofold:
firstly, the difficulty involved in working out quantity and price indices for the United
States. The authors consider that, although some of the benefits of infrastructure may lie
in savings in intermediate inputs, the data at their disposal would be inadequate to reflect
the fact. In the second place, they point out that their attempts to include other intermediate
inputs gave rise to estimations which were much more sensitive when it came to
specifying and fixing the parameters for the model.
5We have tried other public capital aggregations, such as the so-called Òeconomic
infrastructureÓ (EI) which is taken to include transport, hydraulic and urban infrastruture.
The estimations with EI yield similar results to the ones with PC. We have decided not to
use more than one public capital variable in the same regression, because of the colinearity
problem.
6 This is the concept used by SEITZ (1993 and 1994) and SEITZ and LICHT (1995).
Other authors include in the formula the investment tax credit and the present value of
capital consumption allowances multiplied by the tax rate.
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7 Generally  long-term public debt rates are used, but we do not have at our disposal an
uninterrupted series of these. Also, electricity share rates are better at capturing the private
sector risk premium.
8 The results of NADIRI and MAMUNEAS (1994) hardly vary when the stock of capital
is not adjusted. SEITZ (1994) observes that his results improve when the public capital is
adjusted, although the differences do not seem very great. MORRISON and
SCHWARTZ (1996) make no adjustment, although they incorporate capital with one lag .
9 We have tried other specifications, including random effects, but the log-likelihood
ratios and the Hausman test indicate that the fixed effects model is preferable.
10 SEITZ and LICHT, (1995), for example estimate an average elasticity of 0,129 for the
Lnder using a definition of infrastructure similar to the broadest of those used in this
paper.
11 In some regions the problem of underemployment in the agricultural sector is a familiar
one. In fact, costs for some regions and for some years exceed the value added. Another
problem is that the depreciation rates of private capital in agriculture are much lower than
in other sectors, and show a much greater regional variation, all of which influences
private capital stock and capital costs.
12 This variable has only been created for the fifteen Autonomous Communities of
mainland Spain. For the Balearic and Canary Islands ED represents their own stock of
transport infrastructures.
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